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ScienceWeek
SCIENCE POLICY: ON THREATS TO SCIENTIFIC OPENNESS
The following points are made by J.B. Petro and D.A. Relman (Science 2003 302:1898):
1) The scientific community is being confronted by public concerns that freely available scientific information may be exploited by terrorists. Differing points of view among scientists threaten to complicate discussion intended to address these concerns. Skepticism of the existence, breadth, and severity of the threat posed by would-be bioweaponeers is compounded by the failure to find clear evidence of biological weapons in Iraq. Also, some even question the extent to which open-source scientific material contributes to the threat.
2) Recent public discussions regarding the potential for open-source science to enable bioterrorist activities have occurred in a vacuum, without examples of "real-world" activity. This is largely because the need for national security professionals to safeguard sources inculcates a culture of secrecy unlike the openness of the life science community.
3) Books found at the camp describe State-sponsored BW activities and outline the history of biological warfare. The site also contained over 20 vintage research articles and medical publications from U.K. journals of the 1950s and 1960s that provided a method for isolating, culturing, identifying, and producing bacteria, including Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum. Handwritten letters and BW primers found together at the same site suggest that al-Qaida's BW initiative included recruitment of individuals with PhD-level expertise who supported planning and acquisition efforts by their familiarity with the scientific community. When specific information was not available in print, al-Qaida scientists apparently took advantage of symposia where they could obtain tips and techniques directly from unsuspecting researchers (2). The letter reveals plans to acquire bacterial strains, vaccines, production equipment, training, and expertise. The authors suggest the scientific community needs to be aware of this kind of activity. Identification of a recently constructed laboratory (3) with equipment and supplies that could be used to produce biological agents within a few kilometers of the site where the BW-related documents were found strongly suggests that al-Qaida proceeded beyond simply reviewing "dual-use" literature.
4) With publications from nearly 50 years ago, a marginally skilled terrorist could produce a crude agent for use in a limited bioterror attack. However, using more recently published research findings and procedures, casualty rates associated with such an incident would increase dramatically. Thus, our inability to restrict access to already published research in no way absolves the scientific and national security communities of our responsibility to address future findings of concern.
5) The authors conclude: "The life science community should take the lead in partnering with national security professionals to draft guidelines for identifying research of concern and weighing the benefits to national security against the cost to open communication of future life science discovery (5). Furthermore, scientists can help ensure security professionals maintain a working knowledge of cutting-edge tools and data with national security implications. Such a partnership should include scientists who are given security clearance and national security participants that represent the spectrum of relevant agencies with a strong background and training in the life sciences."
References (abridged):
1. Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence G. J. Tenet Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (as prepared for delivery) 6 February 2002. http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/
2. Research papers, clinical studies, and excerpts from academic texts related to Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium species, Yersinia pestis, and other bacterial and viral pathogens. A list of these materials and a sample FOIA request for full documents are available at the URL below.
3. M. R. Gordon, New York Times, 23 March 2002, p. A1.
4. W. S. Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900 (Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2001), pp. 7-16.
5. U.S. National Academy of Sciences, "Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism: Confronting the 'dual use' dilemma" (National Academies Press, Washington, DC, in press); www.nap.edu/catalog/10827.html?onpi_newsdoc100803.
Science http://www.sciencemag.org
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Related Material:
ON BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM
The following points are made by Donald A. Henderson (Science 1999 283:1279):
1) The expected scenario following release of an aerosol cloud of a biological agent is entirely different from that following an attack of nuclear or chemical terrorism. A biological agent aerosol release could be silent and would almost certainly be undetected. The cloud would be invisible, odorless, and tasteless. It would behave much like a gas in penetrating interior areas, and the release would not be suspected for days or weeks later.
2) The implicit assumption has frequently been that chemical and biological threats and the responses to them are so generically similar that they can be readily handled by a single "chembio" expert, usually a chemist. This is a serious misapprehension.
3) Any of thousands of biological agents that are capable of causing human infection could be considered a potential biological weapon, but realistically only a few pose serious problems. Only a very small number of species of these pathogens can be cultivated and dispersed effectively so as to cause cases and deaths in numbers that would threaten the functioning of a large community. The current consensus is that there are 11 pathogens "very likely to be used." *Smallpox, *plague, *anthrax, and *botulism are considered the top four candidates. The others are *tularemia, *glanders, *typhus, *Q fever, *Venezuelan equine encephalitis, *Marburg virus, and *influenza virus.
4) Any group with sufficient resources could purchase prepared supplies of aerosolizable organisms and could transport them easily, because only small quantities are needed to inflict casualties over a wide area. No mechanisms currently exist for screening to intercept such materials at state or national borders.
5) Of the potential biological weapons, smallpox and anthrax pose by far the greatest threats, but these pathogens have different clinical and epidemiological properties. Smallpox poses an unusually serious threat, in part because virtually everyone is now susceptible, vaccination having stopped worldwide 20 or more years ago as a result of the eradication of the disease. It is probable that no more than 20 percent of the world population is protected; for the unprotected, fatality rates after infection are 30 percent. Another problem is that there are no longer any manufacturers of smallpox vaccine, which means large-scale vaccination immediately after an outbreak is currently not possible.
6) Concerning an inhalation anthrax epidemic, the scenario is as dangerous as that for smallpox. After 2 to 3 days anthrax-infected individuals would appear in emergency rooms and doctors' offices with a variety of nonspecific symptoms such as fever, cough, and headache. Within a day or two, patients would become critically ill and then die within 24 to 72 hours. The fatality rate for anthrax is 80 percent or greater.
7) The author concludes: "Once the medical community rallied... in educating peoples and policymakers everywhere about the dread realities of a nuclear winter. Perhaps the same should now be done with respect to the realities of biological weapons, which are now considered to be a more serious threat than the nuclear ones."
Science http://www.sciencemag.org
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Notes by ScienceWeek
Smallpox: This is an acute eruptive contagious disease caused by a poxvirus (Orthopoxvirus, a member of the family Poxviridae). The average incubation period is 8 to 14 days. Following the incubation period, the onset symptoms are constitutional: chills, high fever, backache, headache. In from 2 to 5 days, these symptoms subside and the skin eruptions appear. Considering the temporal course of the disease, a smallpox epidemic would probably not become evident until 2 to 3 weeks after release of an aerosol.
plague: In this context, this term refers to the acute infectious disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis, the disease marked by high fever, toxemia, and prostration. The pathogen is usually transmitted to man by fleas that have bitten infected rodents, and there are various forms of the disease. The incubation period is 2 to 7 days. The fatality rate is near 50 percent, with usually 100 percent fatality for the pneumonic form of the disease.
anthrax: This disease is caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, and is usually transmitted by infected animals through traumatized human skin. The disease is marked by hemorrhage and blood effusions in various organs and body cavities, and by symptoms of extreme prostration. In the context of this report, the disease entity of concern is "inhalation anthrax", which is a more serious human disease than anthrax contracted from an animal through the skin. Inhalation anthrax produces hemorrhagic pneumonia with shock and is usually fatal (fatality above 80 percent).
botulism: This disease is caused by toxins of the bacterium Clostridium botulinum, an organism common in soil and sometimes in animal feces. Symptoms appear 18 to 24 hours after entry of the toxins, and the most severe symptoms are the result of effects on the neuromuscular system. Death occurs from respiratory paralysis or cardiac arrest. The fatality rate is high. Ordinarily, botulism is not an actual human infection, since the human disease is almost always caused by ingestion of food contaminated with toxins produced by C. botulinum, which is anaerobic and grows only under conditions of low or absent oxygen (e.g., in canned foods). The botulinum toxins are among the most highly toxic substances known: the lethal dose for a human is estimated to be in the range 1 to 2 micrograms.
tularemia: This disease is caused by the bacterium Francisella tularensis, a pathogen usually transmitted to humans by biting arthropods (e.g., insects), direct contact with infected animal tissue, ingestion of contaminated food or water, and inhalation of aerosols. Apparently, inhalation of only 50 individual F. tularensis bacteria can result in infection. Symptoms appear within a week. The disease can usually be controlled with antibiotics.
glanders: A common disease of horses, mules, and donkeys, caused by the bacterium Burkholderia mallei. The inhalation form of the disease may lead to primary pneumonia. The disease can usually be controlled with antibiotics.
typhus: A group of acute infectious and contagious diseases caused by the bacterial group Rickettsaie. These diseases are characterized by fever, headache, malaise, and prostration.
Q fever: Also caused by a Rickettsaie bacterium, but the symptoms resemble influenza, nonbacterial pneumonia, hepatitis, or encephalopathy.
Venezuelan equine encephalitis: This is a viral disease usually transmitted by mosquitoes from horses to humans. It is caused by a togavirus, subgroup alphavirus. In humans, the symptoms are similar to those of influenza.
Marburg virus: One of the two notorious African Hemorrhagic Fevers (the other is Ebola virus), highly virulent, with infections usually ending in death. These viruses have the highest mortality rate (as much as 90 percent) of all the viral hemorrhagic fevers. The disease was first recognized in 1967.
influenza virus: Any of a group of influenza viruses, all of the family Orthomyxoviridae. The influenza diseases usually have a sudden onset, are highly contagious, and easily produce large-scale epidemics. Apparently, if only a few cells of the respiratory *epithelium are infected by deposited virus particles, the infection can proceed. The severity of symptoms and the outcome depends on which strain of the virus is the pathogen.
epithelium: In animals and humans, epithelial cells compose the cell layers that form the interface between a tissue and the external environment, for example, the cells of the skin, the lining of the intestinal tract, and the lung airway passages.
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